Strategic Trade and Privatization Policies in Bilateral Mixed Markets by Xu, Lili et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Strategic Trade and Privatization
Policies in Bilateral Mixed Markets
Lili Xu and Sang-Ho Lee and Leonard Wang
Dalian Maritime University, Chonnam National University,
Zhongnan University of Economics and Law
24 July 2017
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/85738/
MPRA Paper No. 85738, posted 10 April 2018 11:01 UTC
Strategic Trade and Privatization Policies in Bilateral Mixed Markets 
Lili Xu 
Department of Economics and Trade, Dalian Maritime University, China 
Sang-Ho Lee* 
School of Economics, Chonnam National University, Korea 
Leonard F.S. Wang 
Wenlan School of Business, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, China 
We consider strategic trade and privatization policies in international bilateral mixed markets where a 
domestic state-owned enterprise competes with both domestic and foreign private enterprises in each 
country. We examine the strategic interaction of two countries’ optimal choices of privatization and 
trade policies with different combinations of production subsidy and import tariff, and find some 
interesting policy implications. First, a higher social welfare can be achieved with the appropriate 
degree of privatization when both governments adopt a production subsidy only. Second, FTA can 
work as a coordination device to solve the prisoner’s dilemma problem. Third, the maximum-revenue 
privatization, combined with zero subsidy and higher tariff, is higher than optimum-welfare 
privatization. Finally, the international bilateral equilibrium needs less degree of privatization and 
lower subsidy rate, even though it is jointly suboptimal from the viewpoint of global welfare.  
Keywords: strategic privatization; international bilateral mixed market; industrial policy; optimal 
tariff;  
JEL classifications: L32; D43; F12 
1. Introduction 
Since the 1980s, many developed and developing countries have continued to privatize their 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) under the global trends of trade liberalization.1 Yet, SOEs are 
strongly concentrated in a few strategic sectors and thus, they still control large portions of the world’s 
resources.2 Over half (in values terms) of all SOEs in OECD countries are significant players in 
sectors such as transportation, telecommunications, power generation, electricity, finance, 
manufacturing, and other energy industries. Along with the open economy and trade liberalization, 
such as negotiations for joining the WTO or establishing free trade areas, FTA has also inspired 
foreign firms’ entry into those industries, even with the existence of SOEs.3 
                                          
*Correspondence: Sang-Ho Lee, Professor, Department of Economics, Chonnam National University, Yongbong-Road 77, 
Bukgu, Gwangju 500-757 Korea. Tel: 82-62-530-1553, Fax: 82-62-530-1559, E-mail: sangho@jnu.ac.kr. 
1 Nellis (1999) showed that from 1980 to 1991, roughly 6,800 medium and large scale SOEs were privatized in non-
transition economies while 60,000 such companies were privatized in transition economies, including hundreds of thousands 
of small SOEs. See also Lee et al. (2013) for more discussions on world-wide trend on privatization. 
2 According to OECD report by Kowalski et al. (2013), among the 2000 largest public companies in the world, over 10% 
SOEs have significant government ownership and their sales are equivalent to approximately 6% of worldwide GDP. See 
also Xu et al. (2016) for more discussions on the important role of SOE. 
3 According to the WTO (2015), the regional trade agreements (RTAs) which are reciprocal agreements on trade between 
two or more partners are the prominent feature of international trade. For example, among 406 RTAs which are in force 
from 1970 to 2015 in the world, the number of FTAs is 232, i.e., more than half of the countries choose to join the FTA. The 
annual increase of new FTAs is over ten percent from 1990s in the worldwide. As of 2014, 227 FTAs are in force and more 
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Although existing literature suggests that there are some gains in the efficiency of a privatized 
firm, researchers in the fields of industrial organization, international trade and development 
economics, and especially those who are interested in the privatization of the SOE, want to further 
explore how the foreign competition affects the desirability of privatization in mixed markets where 
the SOE competes with domestic and foreign private firms. In particular, economic studies on how to 
substantially reset production subsidy and import tariff are still increasingly important. 
The economic modelling of a mixed oligopoly with domestic and foreign competitors begins 
with Fjell and Pal (1996), who investigated the effect of introducing foreign private firms on the 
equilibrium price and allocation of production. White (1996) introduced the production subsidy into 
the mixed market and found that welfare is unchanged by privatization if subsidies are used before 
and after privatization. This privatization neutrality theorem was supported by Tomaru (2006) and 
Kato and Tomaru (2007), who showed that the optimal subsidy, all firms’ output, profits and social 
welfare are identical regardless of the share in a SOE and the objectives of the firms. However, 
Matsumura and Tomaru (2012) showed that privatization matters on the welfare even under the 
optimal tax-subsidy policy if there are foreign competitors. 
Other theoretical literature has analyzed import tariff in an international mixed market. Chang 
(2005) examined a mixed duopoly model with a more efficient foreign firm under Cournot and 
Stackelberg competition, and showed that the optimal level of privatization depends crucially upon 
the strategic substitutability-complementarity assumption. Chao and Yu (2006) found that foreign 
competition lowers the optimal tariff rate but partial privatization raises it. Wang et al. (2012) 
examined the effect of privatization on the priority of the maximum revenue tariff and the optimum-
welfare tariff under Cournot and Stackelberg competitions, and showed that the optimum-welfare 
tariff will be lower than the maximum-revenue tariff regardless of the order of firms’ move when the 
asymmetric marginal cost of the privatized firm is higher than a critical value.  
Some studies simultaneously consider the relations between privatization policy and dual trade 
instruments, production subsidy or/and import tariff, in a mixed market. Pal and White (1998) 
examined the interaction between privatization and strategic trade policies, and found that the welfare 
is always increased with privatization if production subsidy is used only. However, privatization 
increases welfare over much of the parameter space if import tariff is used only. Pal and White (2003) 
also showed that the existence of SOE lowers optimal tariffs and subsidies, but also lowers the total 
volume of trade between the two countries. The lower volume of trade, however, does not translate 
into lower levels of welfare for the trading countries. Chang (2007), Yu and Lee (2011), and Han 
(2012) examined the optimal privatization and trade policies in an international mixed market and 
showed that full nationalization is the best choice under Cournot competition, but the privatization 
strategy is affected strongly by trade instruments and cost difference between firms. Wang et al. (2014) 
examined privatization policy and entry regulation in a mixed oligopoly market with foreign 
competitors and free entry. It demonstrated that as long as the entry cost is relatively lower, domestic 
entry is socially excessive whether it is free trade or the domestic government imposes the tariff policy. 
Wang and Chiou (2015) showed that the welfare effect of privatization will be affected by the trade 
liberalization policy, and the optimum-welfare tariff and privatization should be higher in the presence 
of subsidy policy of foreign country than those in the absence of subsidy policy. 
                                                                                                                                 
FTAs are in the process of being enacted. The well-known inter-regional economic cooperation agreements on FTAs include 
the European Economic Community (EEC), North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Southern Common Market 
(MERCOSUR), and ASEAN Free Trade Area. 
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All those previous studies have still explored the relationship between privatization and trade 
policy in a unilateral mixed market framework, where the domestic SOE competes with domestic and 
foreign firms in the home country. However, as FTA has recently inspired foreign competition into 
domestic market, the strategic interaction between two governments becomes increasing and more 
important. The emergence of FTA requires the study on the further analysis of strategic trade policies 
in the context of international bilateral trade model. 
In the strategic trade literature, Brander and Spencer (1984, 1985) firstly showed that 
government could improve its terms of trade through tariff or subsidy to take a leader position 
transferring a foreign firm’s revenue to a domestic firm. Eaton and Grossman (1986) and Collie 
(1993) also analyzed the welfare effects of trade and industrial policies for a range of specifications of 
an oligopolistic industry and cost asymmetry. Van Long and Stähler (2009) examined that the home 
government can simultaneously subsidize domestic firms and impose tariffs. It is well-known 
proposition of trade theory that in the absence of directly trade-related distortions or policy goals, 
subsidies are superior to tariffs for achieving any economic objective in the pure oligopolistic market. 
On the other hand, Barcena-Ruiz and Garzon (2005) firstly considered an international integrated 
mixed market, comprising of two countries. Assuming that SOEs are less efficient than private firms, 
they obtained that when the marginal cost of the SOE takes an intermediate value, each government 
wants the government of the other country to privatize its SOE. In this case, only one government 
privatizes and that government obtains lower social welfare. Dadpay and Heywood (2006) showed 
that two competing (domestic and foreign) SOEs play the role of trade barriers and the strategic 
interaction of the two governments usually serves to reduce welfare. Han and Ogawa (2008), Lee et al. 
(2013) and Xu and Lee (2015) incorporated import tariff and examined the interaction of two 
countries regarding strategic choices of privatization policy and import tariff. They demonstrated that 
the equilibrium degree of privatization depends not only on the relative efficiency of the SOE, but 
also on choice of trade policy. 
In this paper, we consider an international bilateral mixed market where a domestic state-owned 
enterprise competes with both domestic and foreign private enterprises in the context of intra-industry 
trade. We examine the strategic interaction of two countries’ optimal choices on trade instruments and 
privatization policy. Specifically, we investigate two different options of production subsidy and 
import tariff, coupled with partial privatization, and demonstrate the following main results.  
First, under Cournot competition, a higher social welfare can be achieved when both 
governments adopt a production subsidy instrument with partial privatization in international bilateral 
mixed markets. This is contrasted to the previous results under a unilateral mixed market, such as Yu 
and Lee (2011) and Han (2012), in which the dual trade instruments of subsidy and tariff with full 
nationalization is the best choice. Second, when the SOE take a leader position under Stackelberg 
competition, except for the optimal degrees of privatization, the optimal levels of subsidy, tariff and 
social welfare are the same with those under Cournot competition. This is interesting in that as far as 
the optimal degree of privatization is well chosen, the social welfare is independent of the leadership 
power of the SOE in each country. Third, irrespective of whether symmetric or asymmetric choices of 
two countries on trade instruments between subsidy and tariff, we show that FTA can work as a 
coordination device to solve the prisoner’s dilemma, where both countries could achieve higher social 
welfare if they cooperate and adopt a subsidy instrument only under FTA. Thus, it supports the result 
in Xu et al. (2016), who showed that privatization policy can play the role of commitment device to 
encourage parties to agree to an FTA and thus, it can improve both domestic and global welfare. 
Fourth, we examine and compare the maximum-revenue equilibrium with the optimum-welfare 
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equilibrium and show that the maximum-revenue privatization, combined with zero subsidy and 
higher tariff, is higher than optimum-welfare privatization in international bilateral mixed markets. 
Finally, the international bilateral equilibrium involves less degree of privatization level and lower 
subsidy rate, even though it is jointly suboptimal from the viewpoint of global welfare. This result is 
consistent with the result in Lee et al. (2013), who neither consider the subsidy nor FTA agreements. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic model. In 
section 3, we investigate four different regime choices of production subsidy and import tariff with 
partial privatization under Cournot competition. In section 4, we examine the asymmetric choices of 
two countries on trade instruments between subsidy and tariff, compare the optimal equilibria with 
four scenarios in a unilateral mixed market, compare the results under Stackelberg competition, and 
investigate local optimum for maximum-revenue and global optimum for maximum-welfare. Section 
5 concludes this paper. 
2. The Model 
Suppose that there are two countries: one is the home country (country 1) and the other is the 
foreign country (country 2). The home country and foreign country both have symmetric duopoly 
situations: each country has a state-owned enterprise (SOE) and a private enterprise (PE), which 
producing homogeneous products. We assume that the domestic SOE produce output for its domestic 
market only while the domestic PE can supply not only for domestic but also foreign markets. That is, 
we consider PEs can export the same products to the other country and two countries are engaged in 
intra-industry trade.4  
Both governments adopt a complete set of trade policy instruments, including a production 
subsidy ( 0)is   per unit of output provided to the domestic firms and an import tariff ( 0)it   per 
unit of output imposed on the foreign firms. Let us denote the SOE’s outputs and the PE’s outputs in 
country i as siq  and hiq , while PE’s export outputs as eiq . The inverse demand functions of both 
markets are the same and given by 1 ,i iP Q   where the price of market i is denoted by Pi and the 
output of market i is i si hi ejQ q q q    where 1,2i j  . 
We assume that the cost functions of SOE and PE are quadratic5and given as 2
1( )
2si si
C q q  and 
21( ) ( )
2hi ei hi ei
C q q q q   . Then, the profits of the SOE and PE in country i are 
2
i
1( )
2si i si si
P s q q    ,                                             ( 1 ) 
                                          
4 In reality, the domestic SOEs have significant market shares in sectors such as transportation, telecommunications, power 
generation, electricity, finance, manufacturing, and other energy industries. Thus, for some governmental purposes such as to 
stabilize domestic market prices, SOEs seldom participate in export. Existing literature also shows that international trade 
will induce only the more productive private firms to enter the export market, while some less productive firms will continue 
to produce only for the domestic market when export market entry costs exist (Melitz, 2003; Helpman et al. 2004) or cost 
inefficiency of the SOE (Lee et al. 2013). In the Appendix, even though we allow for SOE to export, we can show that the 
export outputs of the SOE are zero unless full privatization is achieved at equilibrium. 
5 In the mixed market literature, asymmetric costs between SOE and PE proposed the desirability of privatization. See, for 
example, Lee and Hwang (2003), Chang (2005), Lee (2006), and Wang et al. (2009). However, early studies of mixed 
oligopoly, including De Fraja and Delbono (1989), Matsumura (1998), and Pal and White (1998), assumed the same 
increasing marginal cost and showed that partial privatization in mixed oligopoly will improve the welfare. 
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2
i i
1( ) ( ) ( )
2pi i hi j j ei hi ei
P s q P s t q q q        .                          ( 2 ) 
The consumer surplus is denoted as 2
1 ( )
2i i
CS Q . And the social welfare is defined as the sum 
of consumer surplus, domestic industry profits, import tariff revenues, i i ejT t q  and production 
subsidy, ( )i i si hi eiS s q q q   :  
i i si pi i iW CS T S      .                                         ( 3 ) 
The firms’ objective functions are subject to their ownership structures. We suppose that the PE, 
which has characteristics of private property rights, maximizes its profits, while the SOE, which can 
be partially (or fully) owned by the government. We assume that the manager of the SOE maximizes 
the share-weighted objectives between both social welfare and profits6, which are defined as 
( 1 )i i si i iO W     , where i  indicates the tendency of the SOE to seek profits in the process of 
privatization (or the shares owned by private investors). 
In this paper, a two-stage game is constructed. In the first stage, both governments choose the 
levels of tariff, subsidy and privatization to maximize their domestic social welfares. In the second 
stage, the firms observe the levels of tariff, subsidy and privatization and then choose their output 
levels.  
3. The Policy Analysis 
We investigate and compare four regime choices of production subsidy and import tariff, coupled 
with partial privatization under Cournot competition: no trade instrument, production subsidy, import 
tariff and dual trade instruments.  
3.1. Dual trade instruments 
We consider the general case that both governments adopt dual trade instruments of production 
subsidy and import tariff with the privatization policy. In the second stage, the SOEs maximize their 
objective functions, Oi, and the PEs maximize their own profits, pi , after observing the levels of 
privatization. From the first-order conditions, we have the following equilibrium outputs of SOE and 
PE: 
3(20 7 2 5 5 ) (18 83 20 37 11 )1
(27 8 7 8 ) 3(2 12 4 5 )
i j i j i j i j i
si
i j i j j i j i j i jC
s s t t s s t t
q
s s t t s s t t

  
                       
, 
3(5 12 4 10 10 ) (18 7 8 )1
(3 16 2 14 16 ) (6 4 4 5 )
i j i j i j i j i
hi
i j i j j i j i j i jC
s s t t s s t t
q
s s t t s s t t

  
                       
, 
3( 5 11 5 20 ) ( 3 21 3 3 24 )1
( 18 20 26 11 37 ) 3( 2 4 4 5 )
i j i j i j i j i
ei
i j i j j i j i j i jC
s s t t s s t t
q
s s t t s s t t

  
                           
, 
                                          
6 Partial public ownership was introduced by Bos (1991) and George and La Manna (1996). Matsumura (1998) formulated 
theoretical analysis on the mixed market model and investigated the optimal degree of partial privatization. Lee and Hwang 
(2003) incorporated the agency problem into his model and showed that partial privatization is generally optimal both in 
public monopoly and in mixed market under moderate conditions. 
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where i =1,2 and 3(45 19 19 8 )C i j i j        .  
The market output and price of country i are 
9(10 2 3 5 ) (18 50 8 )1
(33 5 22 17 5 ) (6 20 4 5 )
i j i i j i j i
i
i j i j j i j i j i jC
s s t s s t t
Q
s s t t s s t t

  
                      
,  
9(5 2 3 5 ) (39 50 8 )1
(24 5 22 17 5 ) (18 20 4 5 )
i j i i j i j i
i
i j i j j i j i j i jC
s s t s s t t
P
s s t t s s t t

  
                      
. 
The social welfare of country i is7 
 2 2 2 21 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 321 3(15 6 ) 6( ) ( 2 )2i j j j j i j j iCW A A A B B B C C C                . 
Let superscript “D*” denote the equilibrium outcome in dual trade instruments case. Then the 
differentiation of iW  with respect to i , is  and it  yields the following optimal degree of 
privatization, subsidy and tariff rates: 
* 2 1Di   ,  * 17 8 246
D
is
 ,  * 11 7 2138
D
it
 .                             (4 ) 
Substituting the optimal degree of privatization, subsidy, and tariff rates into the above equations, 
we obtain the outputs of SOEs and PEs, * 0.33Dsiq  , * 0.22Dhiq   and * 0.07Deiq  . Note that 
* * *D D D
si hi ejq q q  which implies that the government will strategically use the SOE to act as trade 
barriers and promote the domestic market competition for reaching a higher domestic social welfare. 
It is also noteworthy that the marginal production cost of SOE is higher than that of the PE, which is 
conferring cost disadvantages of export to the SOE at equilibrium. Then the market output and price 
are * 0.62DiQ   and * 0.38DiP  . Finally, the optimal social welfare is * 0.331DiW  . 
3.2. No trade instrument  
We consider the case where both governments do not use any trade instruments but only adopt 
the privatization policy to maximize their domestic social welfares. Let superscript “N*” denote the 
equilibrium outcome under no trade instrument regime. Setting 0i j i jt t s s     into the 
equilibrium and welfare in the previous analysis, we can have the following optimal degree of 
privatization: 
* 13849 99
92
N
i  .                                                  (5) 
Substituting the optimal degree of privatization into the above equations, we obtain the outputs 
of SOEs and PEs, * 0.39Nsiq   and * * 0.12N Nhi eiq q  . Then the market output and price are 
* 0.63NiQ   and * 0.37NiP  . Finally, the optimal social welfare is * 0.327NiW  . 
                                          
7 See Appendix II for the complete expression of the social welfare. 
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3.3. Production subsidy 
We consider the case that both governments adopt a production subsidy instrument with the 
privatization policy. Let superscript “S*” denote the equilibrium outcome under production subsidy 
regime. Setting 0i jt t   into the equilibrium and welfare in the previous analysis, we can have the 
following optimal degree of privatization and subsidy rate: 
* 2929 43
40
S
i  ,  * 8459 93 292921680
S
is
 .                                ( 6 ) 
Substituting the optimal degree of privatization and subsidy rate into the above equations, we 
obtain the outputs of SOEs and PEs, * 0.37Ssiq   and * * 0.16S Shi eiq q  . Then the market output and 
price, * 0.69SiQ   and * 0.31SiP  . Finally, the optimal social welfare is * 0.332SiW  . 
3.4. Import tariff  
We consider the case that both governments adopt an import tariff instrument with the 
privatization policy. Let superscript “T*” denote the equilibrium outcome under import tariff regime. 
Setting 0i js s   into the equilibrium and welfare in the previous analysis, we can have the 
following optimal degree of privatization and tariff rates: 
* 2513 41
32
T
i  ,  * 3516 47 25138553
T
it
 .                                (7 ) 
Substituting the optimal degree of privatization and tariff rate into the above equations, we obtain 
the outputs of SOEs and PEs, * 0.35Tsiq  , * 0.18Thiq   and * 0.05Teiq  . Then the market output and 
price, * 0.58TiQ   and * 0.42TiP  . Finally, the optimal social welfare is * 0.324TiW  . 
3.5. Comparisons  
We compare the results of four different regime choices of production subsidy and import tariff, 
coupled with partial privatization in the international bilateral mixed market.  
Proposition 1: Under Cournot competition, the highest social welfare can be achieved when both 
governments adopt a production subsidy policy only with partial privatization in the international 
bilateral mixed market.  
TABLE I:  Comparisons under Cournot competition in the bilateral market 
 i  it  is  siq  hiq  eiq  iQ  iP  iW  
No instrument 0.20 0 0 0.39 0.12 0.12 0.63 0.37 0.327 
Subsidy  0.28  0 0.16 0.37 0.16 0.16 0.69  0.31  0.332 
Tariff  0.29  0.14  0 0.35 0.18 0.05 0.58  0.42  0.324 
Dual instruments 0.41 0.15 0.12 0.33 0.22 0.07 0.62 0.38 0.331 
TABLE I shows the comparisons of equilibrium results under the international bilateral Cournot 
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competition. Three important remarks are noteworthy. First, both governments cannot achieve a 
higher social welfare when they adopt the dual trade instruments simultaneously, i.e., 
* *0.331 0.332D Si iW W   . This is because the output substitution effect between the SOE and PE is 
weakened while the welfare-reducing effect from the tariff is strengthened under the dual policy 
regime. Thus, the equilibrium results of subsidy regime cannot be sustained when both governments 
have an option to adopt the dual trade instruments when two countries can strategically change the 
rates of subsidy and tariff together under Cournot competition.8 Accordingly, the government chooses 
lower degree of privatization and higher subsidy rates to protect domestic welfare. This is the sharp 
difference between the competitive equilibrium in the bilateral mixed market and the optimal 
equilibrium in the unilateral mixed market such as Han (2012), which will be re-examined in the 
following section. (See Proposition 2) 
Second, this competitive equilibrium provides the prisoner’s dilemma situation and thus, the FTA 
can work for solving this problem. That is, if two countries cooperate and adopt a subsidy instrument 
only under free trade agreement, then both of them could achieve higher social welfare levels. 
However, if two countries adopt the dual trade instruments of subsidy and tariff, then the social 
welfares are lower than those under a single trade instrument with subsidy. Even without subsidy 
policy under the framework of WTO, compared to the result in the import tariff only regime, the 
social welfares are higher when both governments choose no trade instrument regime, 
* *0.327 0.324N Ti iW W   . That is, both governments can achieve higher welfare levels when they 
signed FTA which implies that FTA can work as a coordination device to solve the prisoner’s dilemma 
in the bilateral mixed market. This result can be also applied to the asymmetric trade instruments case 
where domestic and foreign governments adopt different trade instruments between subsidy and tariff, 
which will be discussed in the next section. (See section 4.1) 
Third, both governments cannot achieve the maximum welfare in the first-best allocation even 
under the subsidy regime. When the government decides the direct allocation which maximizes its 
domestic welfare, where the market price is equal to marginal production cost, both governments can 
get the maximum welfare level of * 0.333iW  , which is larger than * 0.332SiW  . It confirms that 
privatization neutrality theorem does not hold when foreign competitor is included in the international 
bilateral trade model under the different optimal subsidy/tariff regimes.9 That is, the effect of 
privatization on welfare is affected by the response of the foreign country’s policy in bilateral trade. 
Thus, strategic bilateral trade leads to a significantly different welfare comparison before and after the 
imposition of production subsidy. In particular, the degree of privatization under subsidy regime 
should be lower than that under tariff regime, which is also lower than that under dual trade 
instruments. 
                                          
8 It is easy to show that the equilibrium in subsidy regime is not an equilibrium in the dual-instrument regime. For this, 
suppose that one country i sets the optimal subsidy, tariff, and privatization at the optimal levels in subsidy regime, i.e., 
* 0.28Si  , * 0.16Sis  and * 0Sit  . Then we can find the optimal responses of the other country j in dual-instrument regime 
are * 0.39Sj  , * 0Sjs  and * 0Sjt  . Thus, the rsulting social welfare of each country is * 0.325iW  and * 0.336jW  , 
which induces country j to deviate from the results in subsidy regime. 
9 Privatization neutrality theorem states that privatization does not affect welfare regardless of time structure, competition 
mode, the number of firms, product differentiation, and the degree of privatization under the optimal tax-subsidy policy. This 
well-known theorem has been discussed in White (1996), Poyago-Theotoky (2001), Tomaru (2006), Hashimzade et al. 
(2007) and Matsumura and Okumura (2013). However, if there are foreign competitors, privatization matters on the welfare 
even under the optimal tax-subsidy policy. See, for example, Matsumura and Tomaru (2012). 
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4. Discussions 
In this section, we first analyze the equilibrium with asymmetric trade instruments where 
domestic and foreign governments adopt different trade instruments. We next compare the 
equilibrium outcomes in the bilateral mixed market with the previous results under a unilateral mixed 
market. We then investigate the results under Stackelberg leadership of SOE and compare them with 
those under Cournot competition. Finally, we investigate the local optimum for maximum-revenue 
and global optimum for maximum-welfare under Cournot competition.  
4.1. Asymmetric trade instruments between subsidy and tariff 
We have considered the symmetric trade instruments case where domestic and foreign 
governments adopt same trade instruments between subsidy and tariff in section 3. Here we analyze 
the asymmetric situation where two governments adopt different trade instruments in the international 
bilateral mixed market, and provide the similar situation of prisoner’s dilemma game.  
Suppose that domestic government adopts a positive production subsidy to its domestic SOE and 
PE, ( 0)is  , and foreign government adopts a positive import tariff, ( 0)jt  . Then, the profit 
functions of SOE and PE, and the social welfare of domestic and foreign countries are as follows: 
2
i
1( )
2si i si si
P s q q    , 21
2sj j sj sj
P q q   , 
2
i i
1( ) ( ) ( )
2pi i hi j j ei hi ei
P s q P s t q q q        , 21 ( )
2pj j hj i ej hj ej
P q Pq q q     , 
( )i i si pi i si hi eiW CS s q q q       , j j sj pj j eiW CS t q     . 
Let superscript “A*” denote the equilibrium outcome in this asymmetric trade instruments case. 
The first-order conditions provide the following optimal degree of privatization, subsidy and tariff: 
* 0.262Ai  , * 0.314Aj  , * 0.148Ais   and * 0.171Ajt  . The optimal privatization level of country i 
which adopts product subsidy is lower than that of country j which adopts import tariff, * *A Ai j  . 
Also, optimal subsidy and tariff levels of both countries are higher than those under dual symmetric 
policy instruments, while optimal privatization is lower than that under symmetric dual policy 
instruments, * *A Di is s , * *A Di it t and * *A Di i  . 
Substituting them into the equilibrium outputs yields the optimal market output and price in the 
two countries, * 0.656AiQ  , * 0.596AjQ  , * 0.344AiP   and * 0.404AjP  . Then, the resulting social 
welfare are * 0.322AiW   and * 0.337AjW  . Note that under asymmetric trade instruments, foreign 
government which adopts an import tariff with privatization policy can achieve a higher social welfare 
than that under symmetric subsidy in TABLE I, i.e., * *( 0, 0) 0.337 0.332A Sj i j jW W      . Thus, 
the government which adopts an import tariff policy under asymmetric trade instruments will be better 
off than that under symmetry trade instrument. However, this asymmetric trade instrument will harm 
the other country which adopts a production subsidy only and thus, will make the other country to 
choose tariff, i.e., * *( 0, 0) 0.322 0.324A Ti i j iW W      . It also yields the prisoner’s dilemma 
situation: if both countries cooperate to choose the subsidy-only policy with partial privatization, then 
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both can get higher social welfares. However, the government under asymmetric trade instruments 
situation will rush to adopt the import tariff in order to obtain a higher social welfare which leads the 
equilibrium of the symmetric import tariff only with partial privatization. (See footnote 7.) 
4.2. Comparison with unilateral mixed market  
We examine the equilibria under production subsidy, import tariff, and dual trade instruments 
choices in the international unilateral mixed market, where there exists one home country in which the 
SOE compete with the domestic PE and one foreign PE. In particular, from the previous models, if we 
set 0,sjq  0,hjq  0,eiq  0,j  0js   and t j  , then we can have the same results with those 
in Han (2012), which are shown in TABLE II. 
TABLE II: Comparisons under Cournot competition in the unilateral market 
 i  it  is  iW  
Subsidy 1 0 0.40 0.340 
Tariff 0.36 0.23 0 0.336 
Dual instruments 1 0.15 0.31 0.346 
Han (2012) showed that the government prefers the product subsidy to the import tariff (p.589, 
Proposition 2), and the social welfare is higher when it simultaneously adopts dual trade instruments 
of subsidy and tariff than that when it only adopts a single-trade instrument whether it is subsidy or 
tariff (p.591, Proposition 4). Furthermore, it is shown that the optimal regime choice is that the SOE is 
privatized completely and the dual trade instrument of subsidy and tariff is used jointly in a unilateral 
mixed market. Therefore, it also confirms that privatization neutrality theorem does not hold when 
foreign competition is included under the different optimal subsidy/tariff regimes. 
The reasoning for the above results is as follows: the role of a subsidy is expanding the total 
industry output while the role of a tariff is reducing the output of foreign firms. Thus, a subsidy 
improves the social welfare through increasing consumer surplus while a tariff improves the social 
welfare through gaining tariff revenue. However, unlike subsidy, the tariff lowers the total industry 
output and thus lowers consumer surplus. It implies that welfare-maximizing government prefers the 
product subsidy to the import tariff.10 Comparing the effects of subsidy and tariff, we can find that 
subsidy can shift production from the high-cost SOE to the low-cost PE, and thus subsidy can induce 
welfare-improving output substitution effect between the SOE and domestic PE. Accordingly, the 
government chooses a higher subsidy and a lower tariff, coupled with complete privatization. 
However, in the bilateral mixed market where the PEs can export their products to the opposite 
country, the reduced output of the SOE through privatization will be substituted by the foreign PE and 
the increased exporting output of domestic PE will increase the cost of domestic PE. Thus, 
privatization will reduce the welfare-improving output substitution effect. It implies that both 
governments will choose the partial privatization in the bilateral mixed market and the effectiveness 
of free trade policy is significant, which is sharply contrasted to the previous results of Han (2012) in 
a unilateral mixed market. In particular, the strategic interaction under competitive equilibrium in the 
                                          
10 This result parallels the analysis of Pal and White (1998), who found that the subsidy is a better choice for the government 
when the cost parameter is not so large. 
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bilateral mixed market requires a less subsidy and no tariff with partial privatization.  
Proposition 2: Under Cournot competition, a lower production subsidy with partial privatization is 
the best choice in the international bilateral mixed market while dual trade instruments of higher 
subsidy and higher tariff with full privatization is the best choice in a unilateral mixed market.  
4.3. Stackelberg competition  
Then, we investigate four different regime choices of production subsidy and import tariff under 
Stackelberg competition in the international bilateral mixed market where the semi-pubic firm acts as 
a leader.11 Let superscript “SD*”, “SN*”, “SS*” and “ST*” denote the equilibrium outcomes under 
Stackelberg competition, respectively. 
We first consider the case in which both governments adopt dual trade instments with the 
privatization simultaneously. Under Stackelberg competition with a dominant semi-public firm, after 
given the announced levels of θi, the SOE maximize Oi and then the PE maximize pi  sequentially, 
observing the levels of privatization and the output levels of the SOE.  
In the third stage, maximizing pi  for a given θi and siq , we can obtain the output of each PE 
3(1 ) 4 4
15
i j si sj i j
hi
t t q q s s
q
      , 3 4 4 2 7
15
sj si i j i j
ei
q q s s t t
q
      . 
In the second stage, each SOE sets its output for given θi, anticipating the reaction of the 
domestic and foreign followers as given. We get the solution 
3008 1297 687 7( 29 391 66 ) 23(38 17 17 ) ( 34 7211 ,
61 ) (233 391 (742 299 )) ( 599 115 (4739 1285 ))
i j i j i i j j i
si
j i j j j i j i j i jS
t t t t t t t
q
t s s
 
       
                          
  
where 7808 2093 2093 561S i j i j       . 
In the first stage, the differentiation of iW  with respect to i , is  and it  yields the following 
optimal degree of privatization, subsidy and tariff rates: * 0SDi  , * 0.12SDis   and * 0.15SDit  . 
Substituting these optimal results, we can obtain the market output and price, * 0.62SDiQ   
and * 0.38SDiP  . The optimal social welfare under Stackelberg competition is * 0.331SDiW  . 
When both governments adopt no trade instrument with the privatization policy, using the similar 
procedures, we can obtain the optimal degree of privatization, * 0SNi  . Substituting the optimal 
degree of privatization, we can obtain the market output, market price and social welfare under 
Stackelberg competition, * 0.63SNiQ  , * 0.37SNiP   and * 0.327SNiW  . 
When both governments adopt a production subsidy with the privatization policy, we obtain the 
optimal degree of privatization and subsidy, * 0SSi  and * 0.16SSis  . Substituting the optimal 
degree of privatization and subsidy, we can obtain the market output, market price and social welfare 
                                          
11 Many quantity setting studies are concerned with the case where firms move simultaneously. Nevertheless, much debate 
among the extensive literature on international trade and industrial organization on the relative merits of the order of moves 
has been witnessed. See, for example, Pal (1998), Fjell and Heywood (2002), Matsumura (2003), Lu (2006, 2007), 
Matsumura and Ogawa (2010), Yu and Lee (2011), and Wang et.al. (2012) in mixed oligopoly markets.  
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under Stackelberg competition, * 0.69SSiQ  , * 0.31SSiP   and * 0.332SSiW  . 
When both governments adopt an import tariff coupled with the privatization policy, we obtain 
the optimal degree of privatization and tariff, ST* 0i   and * 0.14STit  . Substituting the optimal 
degree of privatization and tariff, we can obtain the market output, market price and social welfare 
under Stackelberg competition, * 0.58STiQ  , * 0.42STiP   and * 0.325STiW  . 
TABLE III provides the results under Stackelberg competition in the bilateral market. Comparing 
the equilibria under Cournot and Stackelberg competition in TABLE I and TABLE III, we find that 
the optimal degree of tariff, subsidy and social welfare under Stackelberg competition are the same 
with those under Cournot competition. The only difference is the optimal degree of privatization. The 
reasoning is as follows: the objective function of SOE is the same with that of the government when 
both governments retain all the ownership of SOE. Then, because the SOE can set its output in 
advance of the PE as a Stackelberg leader, the government can enjoy a first-mover-advantage in order 
to achieve the same level of social welfare with that under Cournot competition. Therefore, as long as 
the optimal degree of privatization is well chosen by the government, the social welfare in the 
international bilateral mixed market is independent of the pattern of competition. It is noteworthy that 
this finding is consistent with the unilateral case in Wang et al. (2009), and Yu and Lee (2011). 
TABLE III: Comparisons under Stackelberg competition in the bilateral market 
 i it  is  iW  
No instrument 0 0 0 0.327 
Subsidy  0 0 0.16  0.332  
Tariff  0 0.14  0 0.324  
Dual instruments 0 0.15 0.12 0.331 
 
Proposition 3: When the public firm has a leadership position under Stackelberg competition, except 
for the optimal degree of privatization, the optimal levels of subsidy, tariff and social welfare are all 
the same with the results under Cournot competition in the international bilateral mixed market. 
4.4. Maximum-revenue and global optimum 
Finally, we investigate the local optimum for maximum-revenue and global optimum for 
maximum-welfare under Cournot competition.12 
We first consider the local optimum in which both governments maximize the government 
revenue, i i iGR T S  , instead of the social welfare of each country. Let superscript “GR*”denote the 
equilibrium outcome for maximum-revenue. The differentiation of the government revenue, iGR , 
with respect to i , is  and it  yields the following optimal degree of privatization, subsidy and tariff 
                                          
12 The issue of maximum-revenue tariffs versus optimum-welfare tariffs is interesting because tariff revenue is an important 
income source of the government before building up an efficient tax system. The issue was raised in the literature of strategic 
tariff analysis under oligopoly, see, for example, Collie (1991), Larue and Gervais (2002), Clarke and Collie (2006). Also, 
Wang et al. (2010) and Wang et al. (2012) examined the issue of maximum-revenue tariffs versus optimum-welfare tariffs in 
a different market structure of mixed oligopoly. 
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rates: 
* 0.29GRi  , * 0.14GRit  , * 0GRis  . 
We next consider the global optimum in which both governments maximize the global welfare, 
which is defined as the sum of the social welfare of each country13, i jW W W  . Let superscript 
“GW*”denote the equilibrium outcome of global optimum. The differentiation of W  with respect to 
i , is  and it  yields the following optimal degree of privatization, subsidy and tariff rates: 
* 1
2
GW
i  , * 16
GW
is  , * 0GWit  .  
Then, we compare the maximum-revenue equilibrium with the maximum-welfare equilibrium in 
the following TABLE IV. 
TABLE IV:  Comparisons between maximum-revenue and maximum-welfare 
 i  it  is  iGR  iW  
Local welfare-Max 0.28 0 0.16 -0.11 0.332  
Global welfare-Max 0.5 0 0.17 -0.11 0.333  
Local revenue-Max 0.29 0.14 0 0.066 0.324  
 
Proposition 4: Under Cournot competition, the maximum-revenue privatization, combined with zero 
subsidy and higher tariff, is higher than local maximum-welfare privatization in the international 
bilateral mixed market.  
The economic reasoning is that privatization decreases the output of SOE which also attracts 
more exports from the foreign country. Thus, the increased exports from the foreign country will 
directly lead to an increase in the local government revenue. This finding is still consistent with the 
previous result of Wang et al. (2010, 2012) in a unilatral mixed marekt.  
Proposition 5: The international bilateral equilibrium under Cournot competition yields less degree 
of privatization and lower subsidy rate, even though it is jointly suboptimal from the viewpoint of 
global welfare. 
This proposition indicates that both governments should choose higher privatization levels and 
subsidy rates when they maximize the global welfare even though the local country’s optimal degree 
of tariff is the same as the global optimum, which is zero tariff rate. The intuition comes from the 
strategic interaction between the two independent countries. There is a business stealing effect from 
the foreign firms, and thus, concerning its own country’s welfare, each government will strategically 
reduce the degree of privatization to lessen the business-stealing effect. However, from the 
perspective of global welfare where both governments do not take the business-stealing effect into 
                                          
13 The issue of global welfare-maximization is important to build up an efficient international trade system. In mixed 
oligopoly setting, see, for example, Barcena-Ruiz and Garzon (2005), Dadpay and Heywood (2006), Han and Ogawa (2008), 
and Lee et al. (2013). 
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consideration at all, a higher degree of privatization will increase the cost-saving effect from the PEs, 
and thus increase both the home country’s welfare and the foreign country’s welfare, i.e., global 
welfare. This competitive equilibrium can be seen as the prisoner’s dilemma, which was also 
examined by Han and Ogawa (2008) and Lee et al. (2013).  
5. Conclusions 
This paper considered an international bilateral mixed market where a domestic state-owned 
enterprise competes with both domestic and foreign private firms. We examined the strategic 
interaction of two countries’ optimal choices of trade instruments such as production subsidy and 
import tariff, coupled with privatization policy.  
The main results of our analysis are as follows: First, under Cournot competition, the highest 
social welfare can be achieved when both governments adopt a production subsidy only with partial 
privatization in the international bilateral mixed market. This is contrasted to the previous results 
under the unilateral mixed market, in which dual-trade instruments of subsidy and tariff with full 
nationalization is the best choice.  
Second, we examined the asymmetric choices of two countries on trade instruments between 
subsidy and tariff, and emphasized the importance of FTA as a coordination device to solve the 
prisoner’s dilemma at a competitive equilibrium, where both countries could achieve higher social 
welfare if they cooperate and adopt a subsidy instrument only under FTA. 
Third, when the SOE takes a leadership position under Stackelberg competition, except for the 
optimal degree of privatization, the optimal values of subsidy, tariff and social welfare are the same 
with the results under Cournot competition. This implies that as far as the optimal degree of 
privatization is well chosen by the government, the social welfare in the international bilateral mixed 
market is independent of the pattern of competition. Thus, we showed that the optimal decision on the 
privatization matters on the welfare even under optimal subsidy/tariff regimes. 
Fourth, the maximum-revenue privatization, combined with the zero subsidy and higher tariff, is 
higher than optimum-welfare privatization in the international bilateral mixed market. However, the 
international bilateral equilibrium yields less degree of privatization and lower subsidy rate, even 
though it is jointly suboptimal from the viewpoint of global welfare.  
Finally, one might wonder how robust the results are under alternative scenarios for the various 
modes of competition such as Bertrand competition or/and product differentiation, the number of 
private firms, and more general specifications of demand and cost functions between the SOEs and 
the PEs, and so on. We expect that the importance of FTA in the bilateral mixed market is still 
effective on determining the optimal decisions on the privatization and subsidy rate, even though the 
competitive effect of other factors will increase the degree of privatization and decrease the level of 
subsidy. These policy issues will be challenging issue for the future study.  
Appendix I 
The proof of no-export equilibrium of the SOE 
Suppose that SOE can export output to the other country, which is denoted by sejq . We also 
assume that the cost function of the SOE is given by 2
1( ) ( )
2
S S S S
hi ei hi eiC q q q q   . Then, the inverse 
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demand function is given by 1 ,i iP Q  1, 2i  , where S S P Pi hi ej hi ejQ q q q q    , 1, 2i j  .  
The profit functions of the SOE and the PE, consumer surplus, and welfare of country i are given 
as, respectively:  
21( ) ( + ) ( )
2
S S S S
si i i hi j i j ei hi eiP s q P s t q q q       ,   
21( ) ( + ) ( )
2
P P P P
pi i i hi j i j ei hi eiP s q P s t q q q       ,  
2 21 1 ( )
2 2
S S P P
i i hi ej hi ejCS Q q q q q     , 
( ) ( )S P S S P Pi si pi i ej ej i hi ei hi eiW CS t q q s q q q q          . 
Note that the objective of SOE is given by (1 )i i i i siO W     .  
For general solutions, which allow boundary solutions for the SOE’s export output, i.e., zero 
export output, we should consider Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the maximization problem. However, 
for the time being, we assume that the optimal output of SOE’s export output is zero and solve the 
optimality problem of SOE without considering on the export output of SOE. And then we will show 
that the zero export output of SOE will satisfy the optimal Kuhn-Tucker solutions. Therefore, the SOE 
would not participate in export at equilibrium. 
1. Dual trade instruments ( 0is  and 0it  ) 
In the Table I, we have the welfare-maximizing optimal privatization * 0.41Di  , subsidy 
* 0.12Dis  and tariff * 0.15Dit   .Then, we have the following optimal outputs at equilibrium: 
0.33; 0.22; 0.07s p phi hi ejq q q    Then, from the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for maximizing the 
objective of SOE, we have the necessary conditions for having boundary solution for zero the SOE’s 
export output as follows:  
1 2 3 0.09 0.p p s s s pi ei hj ei hi hj j ei i i is
ei
O q q q q q t q s
q
                 
2. No trade instrument ( 0i is t  ) 
In the Table I, we have the welfare-maximizing optimal privatization * 0.20Ni   and optimal 
outputs at equilibrium: 0.39; 0.12; 0.12s p phi hi ejq q q   . Then, from the Kuhn-Tucker conditions 
for maximizing the objective of SOE, i.e., ,0sejq  0is
ej
O
q
   
 and . 0s iej s
ej
Oq
q
  , we have the 
necessary conditions for having boundary solution for zero the SOE’s export output as follows:  
1 2 3 0.12 0.p p s s s pi ei hj ei hi hj ei is
ei
O q q q q q q
q
            
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3. Production subsidy ( 0i is t  ) 
In the Table I, we have the welfare-maximizing optimal privatization * 0.28Si   and subsidy 
* 0.16Sis  . Then, we have the following optimal outputs at 
equilibrium: 0.37;shiq  0.16;phiq  0.16pejq  . Then, from the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for 
maximizing the objective of SOE, we have the necessary conditions for having boundary solution for 
zero the SOE’s export output as follows:  
1 2 3 0.13 0.p p s s s pi ei hj ei hi hj ei i i is
ei
O q q q q q q s
q
              
4. Import tariff ( 0i it s  ) 
In the Table I, we have the welfare-maximizing optimal privatization * 0.29Ti   and tariff 
* 0.14Tit  . Then, we have the following optimal outputs at equilibrium: 
0.35;shiq  0.18; 0.05p phi ejq q  . Then, from the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for maximizing the 
objective of SOE, we have the necessary conditions for having boundary solution for zero the SOE’s 
export output as follows:  
1 2 3 0.23 0.p p s s s pi ei hj ei hi hj j ei is
ei
O q q q q q t q
q
             
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Appendix II 
The social welfare of country i is 
 2 2 2 21 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 321 3(15 6 ) 6( ) ( 2 ) ,2i j j j j i j j iCW A A A B B B C C C                 
where 
2 2 2
1 184 20 2 (29 17 35 7 ) 2 ( 4 70 13 ) 5(52 59 2 (8 )
( 14 43 ),
i j i j i j j i j i i j
j j
A s s s s t t s t t t t t
t t
              
  
 
2 2 2
2 585 400 107 85 ( 1 7 ) (119 103 175 58 ) 395 175 665
( 124 455 533 ),
i j i i i j i j j i j j
j i j
A s s t t s s t t t t t t
s t t
            
   
 
2 2 2 2
3 921 485 821 106 697 2( 541 262 ) 1244 2 ( 143 63 156
162 ) 2 ( 431 503 925 ),
i j i i i j j i j i
j j i j
A s s t t t t t s s t
t s t t
            
      
2 2 2
1 706 235 (238 339 580 246 ) (253 765 64 ) 5(366 407
55 ( 2 5 ) (98 6 ),
i j i j i j j i j i
i j i j
B s s s s t t s t t t
t t t t
           
    
 
2 2 2 2
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111 ) ( 1 997 1264 ),
i j i i i j j i j i
j j i j
B s s t t t t t s s t
t s t t
           
      
2 2 2 2
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4 ( 71 94 191 ),
i j i i i j j i j i j
j i j
B s s t t t t t s s t t
s t t
             
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2 2
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i j i j i j j j i
j i i j
C s s s s t t t s t
t t t t
          
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2 2
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2
11136 6( 2(9 8 (24 ) (831 634 ) 775 ) 36 (256 128 307 109 )
6(69 422 235 ) 3079 ,
i j j j i i i j i j
j i j j
C s s s s t t s s t t
s t t t
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2 2 2 2
3 36 1168 176 468 475 8 (126 52 149 61 ) 2(54 35 ) 293
8 ( 54 65 73 ).
i j i i i j i j i j j
j i j
C s s t t s s t t t t t
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